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Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between the evolution of real options values
and associated financing policies for Belgian companies in the sector of bio-industries.
Each firm's situation regarding the relevant types of real options is stylistically represented
through a scenario tree.  The consumption of a time-to-build or a growth option is
respectively considered as a success or a failure in company development.  Empirically,
several variables enable us to locate each company along the tree at any time.  The study
of transitions leads us to discover that failures tend to trigger higher leverage, unlike in the
trade-off theory.  Yet, the increases in debt maturity, in lease and in convertible financing
confirm our predictions.  Overall, we emphasize evidence of undercapitalization and of
proper, yet insufficient, use of hybrid financing by biotech companies.
Editorial
On May 27-28, 2002 the National Bank of Belgium hosted a Conference on  "New
views on firms' investment and finance decisions".  Papers presented at this
conference are made available to a broader audience in the NBB Working Papers
no 21 to 33.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 30 - MAY 2002NBB WORKING PAPER No. 30 - MAY 2002
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For the last 20 years, the classical tool used for the analysis of investment de-
cisions, namely the net present value approach (NPV), has been …ercely ques-
tioned by both practitioners and researchers. As Trigeorgis (1993a) points
out, the main critiques are related to the fact that the NPV fails to capture
the value of ‡exibility associated with many investment projects.
The real options approach aims to address the challenge of valuing in-
vestments with signi…cant operating and strategic options. These options,
that are embedded in investment decisions, can be of various types. The
main categories are the option to defer the project, the time-to-build option,
the option to switch outputs or inputs, the option to expand, contract, shut
down or restart a project, the option to abandon and the growth options (see
Trigeorgis (1999) for a review). Moreover, a lot of real-life projects involve
multiple options interacting together (see Trigeorgis, 1993b).
The basic idea behind the real option approach is that the value of a
project is no longer seen as only the discounted value of its expected cash
‡ows: its inherent ‡exibility can be characterized and thus valued almost like
…nancial options. The parallel with …nancial and real options is apparent in
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), who derive theoretical valuation methods for dif-
ferent categories of real options, using a methodology in some points similar
to the derivation of the Black and Scholes formula (1973).
In spite of the great theoretical advances made with the real options
approach of investment decisions, early research in the …eld did not take into
account the challenges of implementing the theoretical models with respect to
speci…c investment projects (Lander and Pinches (1998); Perlitz, Peske and
Schrank (1999)). Actually, recent empirical studies devoted to the testing of
real option pricing models are extremely scarce and mainly focus on clinical
approaches to the pricing of individual projects (see Kellogg and Charnes
(2000); Jägle (1999); Pennings and Lint (1997)).
In particular, the inherent characteristics of R&D projects often make
them di¢cult to value with a classical discounted cash-‡ow analysis. Per
se, every R&D investment involves a lot of uncertainties: a project can fail
at any stage of its development; cash ‡ows at commercialization are very
uncertain; new information can completely change the future cash-‡ows, etc.
The shortcomings of the classical valuation tools are therefore extremely
prejudicial to intensive R&D sectors.
Pennings and Lint (1997) view the R&D decision as the acquisition of
an option to market a new product. They claim that NPV is inappropri-
ate for valuing R&D projects because those with negative NPV would be
rejected, even if in a real option perspective it might be interesting to un-
2dertake them as they could provide valuable information about future cash
‡ows of a project. In other words, the R&D decision is viewed as a growth
option. The principle of such options was …rst exposed by Kester (1984), but
its theoretical modelling has been mainly proposed by Pindyck (1988) and
Kim and Maksimovic (1990).
Another complementary view comes from the …nding that an R&D project
usually has a sequential nature (Dutta, 1997). The investment is often made
up of a number of stages, each one involving the possibility of going further
in the development process or of abandoning the project. Majd and Pindyck
(1987), Carr (1988) and Milne and Whaley (2000) developed the valuation
framework of time-to-build options. More recent contributions can be found
in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) and Panayi and Trigeorgis (1998).
The sequential nature of R&D can be recognized in a lot of projects; but
it is especially visible in the …eld of biotechnologies. Jägle (1999) and Kellogg
and Charnes (2000) give examples of biopharmaceutical R&D projects that
can be analyzed as a sequence of real call options, similar to a time-to-
build option. Each call option gives the right to go to the next phase of the
development process of a drug, if the current stage is successful; conversely, if
the current stage is a failure, then the option is not exercised and the company
can liquidate the project. This framework corresponds to a compound option.
On the other hand, Ottoo’s (1998) valuation of a biotechnology …rm uses
a growth option approach. In his model, the R&D project is seen as an
option to acquire a patent protection of the discovery, which will enable the
biotechnology company access to monopoly rents. He manages to introduce
the potential rivalry between similar …rms in the option valuation framework.
In a similar vein, Reiss (1998) analyzes the use of the option to patent in
a competitive setup. She provides the strategies underlying the decision to
patent an innovation before, after or at the same time as the R&D investment.
While the …rst type of options is especially suited to the case of the
biopharmaceutical industry, growth options introduce a ‡exibility that is
particularly adequate to the sub-sector of technology platform companies in
the biotechnological industry.
In both approaches, R&D investment does not breed one, but a multiplic-
ity of real options. In this case, Trigeorgis (1993b) shows that the presence
of multiple options does not necessarily bear the additivity of the individual
option values. Furthermore, Lander and Pinches (1998) mention that the
assumptions necessary in order to make the model tractable may limit the
scope of applicability of a real option model. Hence, relying on analytical
formulas for real option values is not necessarily an asset when one wants to
t r a c kr e a la p p l i c a t i o n s .
Adding to the complexity of the analysis on the investment side, the pres-
3ence of real options in‡uences …nancing decisions too. In his review paper,
Trigeorgis (1993a) examines the relationship between real and …nancing op-
tions. He shows in the case of the option to abandon how the …nancing
‡exibility o¤ered by a venture capitalist can improve the present value of the
cash ‡ows to equity.
In contrast with a large body of literature, our paper does not directly
focus on pricing issues. Rather, we study interactions between investment
and …nancing decisions of R&D-intensive …rms. This is the reason for our
choice of a very young sector like the biotechnology sector, with a large
majority of companies that have not yet turned out to be pro…table, as the
ideal laboratory for this study.
On the investment side, its starting point is the integration of time-to-
build options and corporate growth options together in a global lattice frame-
work. Encompassing in a stylized way a variety of situations and develop-
mental stages that a biotech company is likely to experience, the scenario tree
proposed in the paper aims to identify its successive creations and exercises
of real options over its early lifetime – from company creation to pro…tability.
With the help of this material, the second aspect covered in the paper
is the empirical analysis of the consistency between biotech …rms’ …nancing
decisions, in terms of their cost-‡exibility trade-o¤, and the pattern of their
investments in real options. The output of this delicate process ought to
be both positive and normative. On the positive side, it represents the …rst
empirical attempt to identify the link between the existence of options on
both sides of the balance sheet. On the normative side, the objective of this
paper is to improve managerial awareness of the need for consistency between
a …rm’s stage of development and its associated …nancing vehicles. This has
implications for the companies themselves, but also for the structure of the
venture capital …nancing that provides most of the funds needed for their
growth.
The paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
used to locate biotech companies in a lattice framework. Section 3 proposes
the implications of real options for the …nancing choices of R&D intensive
companies. Section 4 presents the data and methodology used for empirical
validation. Section 5 discusses the results. The …nal section concludes the
paper and presents di¤erent sets of suggestions.
42 Identi…cation of the development stage
2.1 Modelling principles
The …rst step in our theoretical modelling e¤ort consists of characterizing
the di¤erent operational stages a company may go through during its early
lifetime.
Although every biotechnology company is unique, the whole sector can
be characterized by several key features as far as real options are concerned.
Firstly, the nature of R&D-intensive companies leads to the prevalence of
time-to-build and growth options in their strategic value. Other types of real
options may be present, but not to a systematic extent. Secondly, the sector is
traditionally split into two parts: the biopharmaceutical industry, dominated
by drug-producing companies, and the technology-based companies, which
aim to develop proprietary techniques and services rather than therapeutics.
However, the negative attitude of …nancial markets towards the latter sub-
sector at the turn of the century has triggered a progressive evolution towards
the emergence of mixed product-and-technology oriented companies, so that
the distinction is no longer as clear as it was in the previous century.
As indicated in the introduction, time-to-build options perfectly …t the
biopharmaceutical sector, while R&D e¤ort itself for the development of pro-
prietary knowledge is naturally addressed by growth options. In order to ac-
count for the whole sector, our modelling approach has to integrate both
types of options in a single framework.
In this approach, the company creating a time-to-build option is consid-
ered to hold a real compound option: the passage from one state to another
leads it to exercise a call option on another call option, and this process con-
tinues until the pro…tability stage is eventually reached. Therefore, the …rm’s
stage of development can be situated along an asymmetric decision tree with
one upward branch (corresponding to a whole series of successes) and many
small downward branches (each corresponding to the failure of one stage).
Conversely, the growth option at a given stage can in fact be thought of
as a portfolio of mutually exclusive options on the time-to-build option itself.
The failure of a research, development or commercialization e¤ort leads to
the abandonment of the existing time-to-build option and the activation of a
new option on a similar time-to-build option, but with a lower moneyness. It
means that, for each stage of the time-to-build option, the …rm moves along
a long downward branch (corresponding to a series of up-front investments
leading to no applicable result) with many small upward branches (each one
representing the possible application of an initial investment).
Combining these two sets of options creates a global tree where each node
5corresponds to a certain stage of development of the company. The mapping
of successive instances of exercising or abandoning real options by the biotech
company, from its creation to its maturity, on this scenario tree provides
valuable information on the intensity of its use of time-to-build and growth
options. It represents the …rst necessary step towards the identi…cation of
the relationships between its investments in intangible assets – mainly R&D
– and its …nancing policy.
2.2 Construction of the tree
The construction of a workable scenario tree requires the following assump-
tions:
1. The company has to succeed in three sequential stages before becoming
a mature company. The …rst stage consists of investing in basic research
in order to …nd a product or service to be developed. At the end of this
…rst stage the company possibly patents these results. The second stage
is the development of this product or service, followed by the third stage
of commercialization. If this is successful, then the company eventually
becomes pro…table.
2. At each stage there are three possibilities: the investment may be suc-
cessful and the company moves one stage further; the investment does
not lead to positive results and the company has to restart the same
stage with a failure; or the investment has not given any conclusive
result over the period considered and the …rm remains in status quo.
3. Each branch of the tree corresponds to a new, substantial capital ex-
penditure, either in order to move one stage ahead (in case of success),
or to purchase a new growth option with an additional investment in
the current stage.
4. Whenever the company succeeds in one stage, irrespective of the num-
ber of failures it has experienced before, it begins the next one with a
r e n e w e dg r o w t ho p t i o n .
We denote as i =0 ;1;2;3 the number of distinct stages ful…lled in the
…rst part of the life cycle of the company – i.e. until it becomes pro…table,
and as j =0 ;1;2;::: the number of failures experienced by the company in
its investments in a given stage. Furthermore, the periodicity of observation
is one year.
6The tree including the growth and time-to-build options is likely to be par-
tially non-recombinant. However, its stylized representation - for empirical
purposes - will display a reduced number of nodes. Moreover, the existence
of a growth option also enables the company to abandon the project after
a given number of successive failures. Without loss of generality, we set the
maximum number of successive failures as two.
In order to determine what path each individual company has followed
since its inception and at what stage it is situated, we look at the variation
of the following four variables:
aij = R&D expenditure at node ij
rij = Revenue at node ij
¼ij = Pro…t at node ij
pij = Probability of success at node ij
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Figure 1 presents a stylized version of the scenario tree in the case of
growth and time-to-build options and incorporates the sign of the expected
7variation of the four key variables described above from one node to an-
other. The order within each parenthesis is the same for each branch and
corresponds to: (aij,rij,¼ij,pij). A positive (negative) sign corresponds to an
increase (decrease) in the variable, except for the pro…t variable, for which
we only mention the sign of its monetary value.
We apply the following rules to determine the evolution of these values:
1. At the research and the development stages, any success is associated
with a substantial increase in the R&D e¤ort, whereas in case of a
failure, the subsequent e¤ort to restart the same stage is lowered thanks
to the growth option. The ex-ante probability of success following a
failure is indeterminate, but it tends to zero as the number of failures
becomes large.
2. At the commercialization stage, relative R&D expenses obviously de-
crease, whatever the outcome of the marketing e¤ort. At this stage the
investment of the company will mainly be made in tangible assets.
3. Revenues are considered to increase with the number of successes, ex-
cept in case of a failure at the commercialization stage.
4. Similarly, pro…ts are assumed to be negative as long as the company
has not reached the mature state.
By analyzing this sequence of signs at each branch, we notice that the
research and the development stages have similar features. Therefore the
tree could be shortened for companies where the research and development
stage are mixed (for example, if no patent is issued after the research e¤orts,
it is di¢cult in practice to di¤erentiate between the two stages), or where the
basic research has already been made before the company’s incorporation.
Similarly, the tree could be expanded for companies where the development
stage is composed of easily identi…able sub-stages, as in the drug-discovery
process.
2.3 Evolution of real option values
Once company pro…les are reported on the tree, a second step is now to look
at how the values of the real options vary along each branch.
De…ne Bij and Gij (the value of the time-to-build and growth options
r e s p e c t i v e l y )a tn o d ei;j: Let ¢jBij = Bij+1 ¡ Bij be the di¤erence in the
value of the time-to-build option from node i;j to node i;j+1.T h ee x p r e s s i o n
¢jGij is similarly de…ned. Due to the particular structure of the tree, every
8success leads to a passage from node i;j to node i +1 ;0: Therefore, the
expression ¢iBij corresponds to the di¤erence Bi+1;0¡Bij and similarly with
¢iGij: The relative exercise value of these options, denoted Be
ij and Ge
ij for
the time-to-build and growth options respectively, represents the ratio of the
option value if it were immediately exercised over its total value. Similarly, we
can also de…ne the relative volatility value of the options, denoted B¾
ij and G¾
ij
respectively, as the ratio between the volatility value of the option (de…ned
as the di¤erence between the total value of the option and its exercise value;
see Hull (2000)) and its total value. Obviously, Be
ij + B¾
ij =1 :
The total value of real options held by the …rm, Vij, is just the sum of
the two individual options1:
Vij = Bij + Gij
Thanks to this speci…cation, we can characterize the evolution of these
options with the following stylized analysis:
² According to this partially recombinant tree, every step upwards is
considered as a success: it consumes one stage of the time-to-build
option. Considering that this is essentially a compound option, it results
in an increase of the moneyness of the remaining option while sharply
reducing its relative volatility value. Therefore, we …nd that, in general,
¢iBij > 0, ¢iBe
ij > 0 and ¢iB¾
ij < 0.
² In case of success, the existing growth option is replaced by a new
one at the next stage, irrespective of the number of successive failures
experienced. Due to the scale enhancement following each success, the
new growth option value is likely be greater but, as the e¤ort is less
R&D intensive, the output of the investment is likely to be less volatile




² When the company experiences a failure, it decides to postpone (or
abandon) the exercise of its time-to-build option. This is due to the
fact that the odds have decreased, and the …rm must exercise part of
its growth options in order to let the project continue. By becoming
less in the money, the compound option value decreases but its relative
volatility value increases: ¢jBij < 0, ¢jBe
ij < 0 and ¢jB¾
ij > 0:
1In this case, the options are perfectly complementary and so additive because their
values are considered node by node, taking into account the interactions between them as
successes and failures occur.
9² The failure at a development stage involves the possible exercise of
a growth option if the …rm wants to keep its time-to-build options
alive. However, unlike the time-to-build option, growth options are not
compound options: they represent a portfolio of options on the time-
to-build option ranked by decreasing value order. The exercise of one of
them induces a decrease in total option portfolio value. The remaining




Consequently, the occurrence of a success or a failure leads to an unequiv-
ocal variation in total real option values: for a success, ¢iVij > 0, ¢iV e
ij > 0
and ¢iV ¾
ij < 0: For a failure, ¢jVij < 0, ¢jV e
ij < 0 and ¢jV ¾
ij > 0: This leads
to the following workable hypothesis:
Proposition 1 Each success on the scenario tree increases total option value,
but reduces its relative volatility value; the reverse holds for each failure on
the scenario tree.
Proof￿:￿ Fo￿l￿l￿ows￿ fro￿m￿ t￿he￿ a￿b￿ove￿ di￿s￿cus￿si￿o￿n.
For each path, we are thus theoretically able to characterize whether the
…rm has increased or decreased the optional component of its investments
from the previous stage. This must be related to the aim of the paper, which
is primarily to link the investment process of these …rms with their …nancing
policies.
2.4 A note on status quo
Proposition 1 provides clear-cut interpretations for movements along the tree
with respect to their impact on real option values. Unfortunately, it does not
provide any satisfactory explanation for the situation where a …rm fails to
move from one period to another, i.e. it remains in its status quo.
In fact, the e¤ect of such a lack of development is indeterminate. One can
interpret it as a failure: in this case, the immobility of the company would
indicate its inability to turn a project into a success, forcing it to undergo an
undesirable delay in its development. This kind of explanation is likely to be
more relevant in the case of an advanced stage such as commercialization or
pro…tability. On the other hand, status quo could be interpreted as similar to
success where there is a long development process that requires several years
of e¤ort. The absence of movement along the scenario tree indicates that the
project has not been abandoned early, which is quite good news.
Of course, one cannot unequivocally associate a status quo with a success
or a failure for a given stage on the tree. However, the above discussion
10suggests the possibility of a more favorable interpretation of immobility at the
R&D stage than at the commercialization stage. However, this is a conjecture
rather than a hypothesis, and also needs to be checked against real data.
3 Identi…cation of …nancing needs
This section reviews theoretical as well as empirical evidence on capital struc-
ture decisions in the presence of real options, with a focus on the foreseen
implications for the nodes and branches of the above developed scenario tree.
3.1 Traditional theories of capital structure
The traditional theories of capital structure, namely the so-called ‘trade-o¤
theory’ and the ‘pecking order theory’ do not explicitly address the presence
of real options and the subsequent need for …nancial ‡exibility. They mainly
focus on the role of debt and equity, and do not explicitly account for the
role of hybrid …nancing instruments – such as convertible bonds, preferred
stocks or warrants – in capital structure decisions.
3.1.1 Trade-o¤ theory
This theory is the historical extension of the seminal papers of Modigliani
and Miller (1958, 1963). In the presence of taxes, Modigliani and Miller
(1963) conclude, in their Proposition 1, that …rms should entirely …nance
their investments with debt. Of course, the underlying motivation for using
debt is the deductibility of interest expenses. In particular, a young company
that has not yet reached pro…tability may not fully bene…t – or even not at
all if tax loss carry-forwards are never used – from the tax shield of debt. In
this case, the pure no-tax model claims the irrelevance of capital structure
decisions.
In the presence of direct as well as indirect costs of …nancial distress
(see Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) for a recent
review), which are assumed to grow more than proportionally with the debt
ratio, actual …rm leverage is likely to decrease and be set to a target level.
In the context of this theory, the presence of real options is only indi-
rectly represented through the factors that in‡uence the costs of …nancial
distress. In particular, a speci…c form of agency con‡icts, namely between
shareholders and debtholders, predicts that the presence of growth options
in the investment prospects of the …rm has a strong in‡uence on the optimal
level of debt.
11The underinvestment issues due to the debt overhang problem (Myers,
1977) tend to preclude managers of highly risky …rms from investing in pos-
itive NPV investments if they fear that the cash ‡ows to equity would not
be su¢cient due to excessive debt costs; on the other hand, the asset substi-
tution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976) leads
shareholders to expropriate value from bondholders by adopting over-risky
investment projects. In the presence of debt, these two types of issue increase,
and debt becomes more costly in order to protect bondholders against misbe-
havior by managers, who represent shareholders. The relevance and intensity
of these problems is directly related to the volatility of future cash ‡ows: for
a growth …rm, they are likely to be more serious, making debt less attractive
(Myers, 1977; Green and Talmor, 1984). Along the same lines, Miguel and
Pindado (2000) empirically show that the indirect bankruptcy costs of debt
are positively related to the proportion of intangible assets, whose liquida-
tion value are lower than tangible assets, while volatility of asset value is also
likely to induce a greater probability of default (Anderson and Sundaresan,
1996).
Since the tax shield argument is hardly relevant for young …rms in the
biotechnology sector, one would expect a low target debt ratio. Moreover,
these …rms exhibit a risk pro…le that makes them prone to debt-related
agency problems. In particular, every failure that leads to a higher relative
volatility value of the real options is likely to increase the intangible propor-
tion and volatility of these companies’ assets. Conversely, the partial exercise
of time-to-build options reinforces the asset base and the intrinsic value of
real options, calling for higher leverage. Consequently, on the basis of the
trade-o¤ theory, we expect that each failure at the R&D stage will reduce
leverage while each success will trigger a positive variation of the gearing
ratio. The theory is inconclusive on status quo situations.
3.1.2 Pecking order theory
Donaldson (1961) discovered that …rms tend to primarily …nance new invest-
ments with internal cash ‡ows, and if they have to go to the …nancial market,
they …rst rely on new debt, then on convertible bonds, then on additional
equity. Based on the information asymmetry between managers and the …-
nancial markets, Myers and Majluf (1984) formalized this …nding, under the
term ‘pecking order theory’.
There is a considerable debate in the literature about the implications
of the pecking order theory for growth …rms with little internally generated
cash ‡ows and high …nancing needs. As previously mentioned, the trade-
o¤ theory predicts low leverage levels; however, on the basis of the pecking
12order, the …rst available source of funds for these companies should actually
be debt. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) empirically document that, while
evidence of a target leverage may be sustained for the cross-section of listed
…rms, their dynamic behavior more closely corresponds to the hypotheses of
the pecking order theory.
Since the scenario tree implies that …rms are observed in their dynamic …-
nancing decisions, the ordering of …nancing sources is a relevant issue. Along
the tree, …rms hardly generate internal cash, so that their new …nancing
needs do usually force them to ask for outside funds. The pecking order the-
ory predicts that the lower the need, the more likely it is that …rms will issue
mainly debt. For larger needs, debtholders alone may not be able provide
su¢cient funds, so that the company has to turn to the shareholders. Since
a failure requires less funds than a success, leverage is predicted to be lower
in the latter situation. As stressed by Fischer, Henkel and Zechner (1989),
convertible debt is located between debt and equity in the preference order-
ing underlying the pecking order theory. Therefore, when outside funds are
required, it is predicted that …rms will try to issue convertibles before going
to the stock market.
It must be stressed, however, that this theory is relevant for situations
where information asymmetries are likely to be serious, i.e. for relationships
between …rms and the outside market. When fund providers monitor the
…rm closely, as in the case of bank or venture capital …nancing, moral hazard
is less relevant to the analysis. Therefore, this result is mostly salient for
public debt.
3.2 Private …nancing vehicles
3.2.1 Venture …nancing
The …nancing of biotechnology companies in their early development stage is
typically dominated by the recourse to equity issues subscribed to by business
angels and venture capitalists (henceforth VCs). This recourse is motivated
by two main reasons: young …rms with high R&D expenses and a high pro-
portion of intangible assets face high incentive problems related to serious
information asymmetries (see Helwege and Liang (1996) for an empirical val-
idation), making monitoring extremely valuable for the reduction of agency
issues (Lerner, 1995); and their exit strategy does not put a high emphasis
on the valuation of majority stakes, which allows entrepreneurs to value their
call option on control (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Black and Gilson, 1998).
In this agency framework, Bergemann and Hege (1998) show that VC
…nancing provides better monitoring than arm’s length (i.e. outside) eq-
13uity. VCs acquire information on the …rm’s quality in connection with their
investment. In this context, successes release positive information on the
quality of the …rm, resulting in greater expected value to be shared among
the entrepreneur and the VCs. It is predicted that the equity share of the
entrepreneur is likely to steadily decline. All in all, …nancing by VCs will
thus mix new debt and equity as successes pile up.
If failures in the R&D process accumulate, the liquidation value of the
…rm is likely to decline, and VC monitoring will become closer, because
the entrepreneur will only be rewarded in case of success. Therefore, the
model predicts that the …rm will then issue more debt than equity or, more
conveniently, convertible debt, which better …ts the needs of both parties.
Leverage may then increase because of this greater control required by VCs,
contradicting the common argument of the trade-o¤ theory, which would
suggest that the gearing ratio should become lower.
3.2.2 Debt structure
Given that most …rms in the biotechnology sector are not listed, the bulk of
their debt structure is private. In the spirit of the analysis of Bergemann and
Hege (1998), private debt o¤ers more ‡exibility than arm’s length debt (see
Anderson and Makhija, 1999).
Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) empirically show that
…rms with high contracting costs tend to use mostly private debt. As put
forward by James (1987), public debt typically has a longer maturity than
private debt. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (2000) argue that high growth
…rms tend to issue shorter-term, private debt in order to mitigate Myers’
underinvestment problem. These …ndings, together with the study of Barclay
and Smith (1995) relating contracting costs to the presence of growth options
in the asset structure of the …rm, suggest that the relative importance of
growth options calls for private debt …nancing with a shorter maturity than
public debt when the relative growth option value is high; i.e. when the …rm
moves down on the scenario tree. By contrast, the extension of maturities
and the relatively higher proportion of tangible assets in case of exercise of
time-to-build options would lead to a shift towards public investments with
longer average debt maturities.
3.2.3 Debt maturity
Although the preceding subsection suggests that the optional component
of the asset structure calls for higher amounts of private debt with shorter
average maturities than public debt, it does not provide insights into maturity
14structures inside debt classes.
Bergemann and Hege (1998) show that longer maturities provide a greater
scope for renegotiation, and that short-term re…nancing on a competitive ba-
sis can never be optimal. The consumption of growth options in case of fail-
ures reduces the value of the total growth options portfolio while increasing
its relative volatility value, leading to this need for greater …nancial ‡exibil-
ity. In the scenario analysis of Trigeorgis (1993a), the ability to renegotiate
debt is shown to provide a valuable source of ‡exibility for the entrepreneur
experiencing a failure in a development stage. As failures lead to an increase
in the relative volatility value of the growth as well as time-to-build options,
this suggests that average debt maturity – irrespective of the optimal debt
level – should increase for a company moving down the scenario tree.
3.2.4 Leasing
The role of lease …nancing for start-ups should not be underestimated. For
small, high-tech start-ups, debt monitoring by banks may prove to be less
easy than for more mature businesses. When the …rm experiences a shortage
of funds, e.g. after one or a series of failures, it may be led to obtain new
cash through the least costly source of outside funds in terms of information
asymmetry. The debt contract that provides immediate guarantee to the
lender in case of liquidation is the leasing contract. Not surprisingly, empirical
evidence, although limited, documents that leasing is a favored source of
debt in the pecking order theory for the compensation of a shortage of funds
(Huyghebaert, 2001). This suggests a relatively heavy use of lease …nancing
for companies experiencing failures in their R&D process.
3.2.5 Hybrid …nancing
The role of hybrid …nancing for small growing companies is particularly well
documented for convertible debt. Preferred equity is the least favored source
of …nancing in the pecking order theory (Fischer, Henkel and Zechner, 1989).
Debt with warrants shows some similarities with convertible bonds, but with
a greater focus on its ability to kick new equity upon exercise of the options.
This technique is most suitable for listed companies with an active secondary
stock market, and seldom used for small start-ups.
A common argument in the literature is that the issue of convertible
securities is an excellent …nancing vehicle for high growth, young …rms whose
riskiness is hard to assess and who are thus able to sell their volatility through
an option-related …nancial security (Brennan and Schwartz, 1992). When
straight debt becomes more expensive, i.e. after some failures have taken
15place, convertible debt becomes an increasingly favored solution for issuing
securities that do not have to send negative signals to the market. This
“pooling equilibrium” explanation to the issue of hybrids is validated by
Bhabra and Patel (1996) and Munro (1996).
Consequently, when the relative volatility value of the option increases,
the issue of convertibles is an e¢cient way to avoid signalling a failure to the
market. This …nancing vehicle is thus consistent with downward movements
on the scenario tree.
This argument is somewhat formalized by Trigeorgis (1993a) and Mayers
(1998), who heuristically show that the presence of real options makes the
availability of ‡exible …nancing instruments valuable. On the other hand,
in the absence of real options, the traditional trade-o¤ theory suggests that
basic …nancing vehicles like debt or equity are preferable to hybrid securities
in terms of tax shield and bankruptcy considerations respectively.
3.3 The role of patenting
In this framework, protection of intellectual property may be interpreted
di¤erently, depending on whether the company has gone up or down on the
tree.
It is commonly argued that R&D investment creates real options for
patenting. According to Takalo and Kanniainen (2000), protecting intellec-
tual property through the issue of a patent has the immediate consequence
of decreasing the relative volatility value of the existing options, but also cre-
ates an additional option to wait. Therefore, patenting leads to a slow-down
in the market introduction of the commercial product, and calls for longer-
term but also ‡exible …nancing. In addition, the patent transforms intangible
research into a tangible asset, inducing debtholders to require relatively less
exigible …nancing devices such as short-term debt, especially after a failure
in R&D.
Hence, the observation of patent adoption at a given stage or between
two stages would be consistent with a relatively high amount of convertible
debt or equity, and certainly a reduction of short-term debt …nancing.
3.4 Summary
From all these theories and empirical validations, it is now possible to stylize
the likely developments of the capital structure in the case of a failure and
of a success in the R&D or commercialization process.
The discussed models predict the following di¤erences with respect to
successes:
16H1. higher leverage in case of success (subsection 3.1.1); lower leverage
in case of failure except for higher debt …nancing by VCs (subsection 3.2.1)
H1a. among public …nancing sources, the issue of more debt than equity
in case of failure; the reverse in case of success (subsection 3.1.2)
H1b. higher debt …nancing by VCs in case of failure; the reverse in case
of success (subsection 3.2.1)
H2. lower equity ownership (in %) by VCs in case of failure; the reverse
in case of success (subsection 3.2.1)
H2a. more private debt …nancing than public debt …nancing in case of
failure; the reverse in case of success (subsection 3.2.2)
H3. longer debt maturity in case of failure; the reverse in case of success
(subsection 3.2.3)
H4. more lease …nancing than other types of debt …nancing in case of
failure; the reverse in case of success (subsection 3.2.4)
H5. more convertible …nancing than other types of debt …nancing in case
of failure; the reverse in case of success (subsection 3.2.5)
Overall, therefore, available research predicts a reduction in leverage with
ar e s h u "ing of debt instruments when the …rm experiences failures in R&D
in comparison with the situation where the company evolves to the prof-
itable stage. However, VC …nancing may turn towards debt instruments for
monitoring purposes as the …rms’ projects become more hazardous.
Hypotheses H1a, H1b and H2a are sub-hypotheses that look more closely
at the structure of ownership (public, private and VC) rather than at their
nature. We will see later how di¢cult – and even impossible – it is to test
these with Belgian data.
Furthermore, …rms that patent from one stage to another are likely to
use more ‡exible and long-term …nancing, such as convertible debt (H6).
In the next section we will detail the methodology used to tests these six
hypothese empirically.
4D a t a a n d m e t h o d o l o g y
We come now to the second aspect of our study: the empirical analysis of
Belgian biotechnology …rms’ capital structure with respect to the theoretical
proposals elaborated in the …rst part of the paper. In order to perform
this empirical study, we …rst describe the sampling process. Then we detail
how we de…ne and construct the variables needed for the hypotheses tests
on capital structure. The end of this section is devoted to the empirical
equations used to test these hypotheses.
174.1 Sampling process
The Belgian biotechnology sector is not recognized per se in the NACE in-
dustry codes system; this is explained by the fact that biotechnology can
lead to various applications. Indeed, the bio-industry is traditionally split
into three segments. The bio-pharmaceutical segment includes drug develop-
ment, diagnostics and medical devices, medical services and bio-informatic
…rms. In the bio-agro segment, biotechnology is used in agriculture and the
food industry. Finally, the bio-environmental segment uses biotechnological
processes for waste treatment and recycling. Given this broad range of ap-
plications, it is not straightforward to identify the companies active in the
biotechnology sector. This is why we did not use company selection criteria
based on a formal sector classi…cation; rather, we selected …rms2 on the basis
of various listings established by di¤erent associations or public organisms
supporting biotechnology in Belgium. More precisely, we used information
from the Belgian Bio-Industry Association, the DGTRE of the Walloon Re-
gion and the VIB of the Flemish Region, as well as secondary sources3.B y
integrating these various sources of information, we obtained a list of 80
companies representing the population of Belgian biotechnology …rms.
The theoretical model is set up in order to characterize a young growing
biotech company from its inception and to look at how its path from early
research to pro…tability is …nanced. The aim of this research therefore highly
in‡uences the sampling process and leads to the elimination of a certain
number of …rms.
First, our population contains both stand-alone companies and biotech
subsidiaries of large multinational biotechnology or pharmaceutical compa-
nies. These subsidiaries were excluded from our sample partly because they
do not …t into our model of young growing biotech companies, but also be-
2By …rms, we mean commercial and industrial corporations. This therefore excludes
university or public laboratories.
3Our company list emerges from the integration of the following primary sources:
- Belgian Bio-Industry Association (BBA), www.bba-bio.be (2001);
- Directorate General for Technologies, Research and Development (DGTRE), Wallonia
Homeland for Biotechnology (June 2001);
- Flanders Interuniversity Institute for Biotechnology (VIB), www.vib.be (2001).
These primary sources were supplemented and/or compared with various secondary
sources:
- Brandeleer M., L’or des gènes: promesses belges (October 12, 2000), Trends-Tendances,
pp.20-28.;
- Briquet L., Biotechnologies: “Le” secteur du XXIe siècle? (November 14, 2000),
L’Echo,p .4 . ;
- Rentier B., Biotechnology in Wallonia: recent initiatives (May 2001), presentation at
the Bioforum, Liège.
18cause their a¢liation to a mother company precludes relevant comparisons
with stand-alone companies and makes their capital structure dependent on
their mother company, both on the equity and the liabilities side. Second,
part of our population is made up of very young companies for which we
do not necessarily have the annual accounts data, or only one year of data.
Consequently, a few companies were excluded for data availability reasons.
Third, some companies labelled nowadays as biotechnology …rms are in fact
older agro-food or pharmaceutical …rms that only switched to biotechnology-
oriented activities in recent years. In the case of three of these, the activity
switch date is clearly mentioned in their annual report. But for other com-
panies, the timing of the activity switch is unclear, and consequently leads
to their exclusion. Moreover, these companies were usually created before
1984, the …rst year of the current format of annual accounts. These companies
therefore also have to be excluded because of data availability and compara-
bility problems. Finally, some …rms were eliminated because their activities
did not in our opinion obviously classify them as part of the biotechnology
sector.
In summary, our …nal sample includes forty Belgian companies with an
average life of nine years. The distribution of this sample across regions and
bio-segments and the names of the companies are presented in the appendix.
4.2 Variables de…nition and construction
Two sets of variables are needed for the empirical analysis. The …rst set
contains positioning variables used to locate each company along an empirical
tree. The second set is made up of …nancing variables necessary to test the
capital structure hypotheses.
4.2.1 Positioning variables based on an empirical tree
The …rst step in the empirical study consists of locating, for every accounting
year, each biotech …rm along an empirical tree (bearing in mind that they
may stay for several periods at each node). In order to perform this location,
we de…ne four criteria variables representing binary information about the
sign of either the absolute value or variation of a number of asset and income
variables. These criteria then allow us to build up a simpli…ed version of the
theoretical tree and to derive a number of rules in order to associate with each
observation one of the three stages depicted in the empirical tree. Among
the R&D and commercialization stages, we re…ne the rules to discriminate
between a failure and a status quo situation. Finally, the evolution of each
19company from one node of the tree to another enables us to construct a
“branch” variable.
De…nition and construction of the criteria variables The most basic
classi…cation of the observations is the cuto¤ point between the pro…tability
state and the other stages. For this purpose we build a discrete variable
indicating whether the company is pro…table or not. The pro…tability dummy
is equal to 1 when the operating result is positive and greater than in the
previous year.
A second classi…cation level concerns the distinction between commercial-
ization and R&D. Several variables can be used for this purpose: R&D ex-
penses, revenues, and acquisition of tangible assets. Nevertheless, we choose
to construct a criterion based only on the variation of the acquisition of tan-
gible assets. It is reasonable to link the commercialization stage with an
increase in tangible asset investments, as at this stage the company needs to
set up the production tools. The tangible assets dummy is de…ned as being
equal to 1 when the acquisition of those assets is greater than in the previous
years.
We do not use the evolution of R&D expenses or revenues for the second
classi…cation level because they are needed at a third level, in order to detect
failures within the R&D and commercialization stage. The R&D binary
variable is equal to 1 if R&D expenses or investments in intangible assets
is greater than in the previous years. We also include intangible assets in
this criteria because such items, when they do not directly consist of R&D
expenses, are nevertheless closely related to the research and development
activity of the …rms. In our sample, the majority of intangible assets other
than R&D expenses are patenting costs. The revenue variable is equal to
1 when operating revenues, sales or added value are greater than in the
previous year. The use of added value as a measure of the activity evolution
is motivated by the fact that this is the only measure that has to be released
in abbreviated versions of Belgian annual accounts. Table 1 summarizes the
annual accounts data sources for each positioning variable4.
4We bene…ted from accounting data provided by NBB (Brussels). This data was then
updated by the Liège branch of NBB. We would like to thank the NBB sta¤, and partic-
ularly J. Devrecker at the Liège branch, for their precious help.
20Table 1: De…nition of the positioning variables
Positioning variable NBB accounts item
Pro…tability dummy 70=64t and ¢70=64t
Tangible assets dummy ¢8169t
Revenue dummy ¢70t, ¢70=74t or ¢9800t
R&D dummy ¢RD5
tor ¢(8029 + 8049)t
Location on the empirical tree Figure 2 depicts a simpli…ed version of
the theoretical tree.


























Comparing to Figure 1, the research and development stages have been
merged. Moreover, this tree allows for “comebacks” along the tree. For the
empirical study,we need to distinguish only three stages for success and one
node for all failures in one stage:
5The de…nition of R&D will be detailed later in this section. Our R&D variable contains
more information than the amount of item 8021 in the annual accounts; it has been
supplemented from various secondary sources.
21- Stage 1: Research and development, represented by nodes R and RF
(for R&D after a failure);
- Stage 2: Commercialization, represented by nodes C and CF (for com-
mercialization after a failure);
- Stage 3: Pro…tability, represented by node P.
Construction of the “node” variable In order to associate every ac-
counting year with a single node of the empirical tree, we build up a set of
rules derived from the values the positioning variables de…ned above. Most
rules are straightforward with respect to the de…nition of the stages. Node P
is associated with a positive pro…tability dummy. Nodes C and CF are both
associated with a positive tangible assets dummy. Nodes R and RF derive
naturally from a zero value in both of these …rst two dummies. Node CF is
selected when the revenue dummy is nil and node C is selected otherwise.
Finally, a failure in the R&D process has been associated in the …rst part
of the study with a reduction of R&D investments. Therefore, node RF is
associated with an R&D dummy equal to 0, node R being selected otherwise.
As these rules derive mostly from variables speci…ed in terms of variations,
they cannot be applied per se to the …rst observation of each …rm. This is
why we use a second set of rules for the initial node. Per de…nition, the initial
node cannot be one of the “failure” nodes RF and CF, but is not necessarily
the R&D stage. Three supplementary rules are therefore needed. To detect a
stage P initial node, we use only the sign of operating pro…t. The distinction
b e t w e e nt h e… r s ta n ds e c o n ds t a g ec a n n o tb em a d ew i t ht h eh e l po fat a n g i b l e
asset variable. Instead, we use another accounting item characterizing the
commercialization stage: the presence of positive inventories. If inventories
are nil, then the initial stage is R&D.
All these rules allow us …nally to create a discrete position variable that
can take three possible values according to the stage the company is engaged
in. We will use this position variable in the empirical study to describe static
capital structure characteristics of the three stages under consideration in
our study.
Construction of the “branch” variable The last step in this locating
procedure consists in detecting successes, failures and status quos in the …rst
two stages. Again, a set of simple rules allow us to detect the dynamic aspect
in the tree. Most rules are straightforward when ones looks at the empirical
tree. A success in commercialization is always related to the change from
stage 2 to stage 3. A similar rule holds for a success in R&D, with one
supplementary case: a direct route from stage 1 to stage 3 must be interpreted
22in the same way as one from stage 1 to stage 2. The detection of failures in
stages 1 and 2 is directly linked to a position on nodes RF and CF. Finally,
a status quo situation in stages 1 and 2 arises when the company either
begins on the tree in these stages or remains in these stages from one year
to another.
Some special branches that can arise in the data set must be taken in to
account. First, when a company goes back from stage 3 to 1, we interpret
this as a new start and associate a status quo situation in stage 1 with this
branch.
Second, one step backward (from stage 3 to 2 or 2 to 1) is more di¢cult
to interpret. It can mean a failure or a status quo situation in the “arrival”
stage. For this reason, we decided to leave this issue for interpretation with
empirical tests.
We summarize the dynamic information in a discrete evolution variable,
which can take eight di¤erent values: failure, success, or status quo in R&D
or commercialization (6 values), pro…tability, and undetermined evolution.
An o t eo nR & De x p e n s ed a t a6 The R&D expense measure used for
the positioning variable does not solely correspond to the amount of R&D
acquisitions in the annual accounts. Measuring the R&D e¤ort of a company
is quite di¢cult in the current version of annual accounts. R&D may of course
be found within intangible assets once they are capitalized. But it may also
remain in the income statement, where it becomes virtually impossible to
discriminate between expenses according to their purpose.
This identi…cation problem can be partly solved by reading the “manage-
ment report” included in the complete annual accounts. Belgian company
law requires …rms to detail their R&D activity in this report. Neverthe-
less, as Art. 96 of Belgian company law does not clearly state what kind of
information the management report has to give about R&D policy, the infor-
mation provided in the management report is not always useful for gaining
insight into R&D expenses in the income statement. Despite this limitation,
all quantitative data in the management report was taken into consideration
i nt h eR & De x p e n s ev a r i a b l e .
We also checked the R&D measure using non-accounting information. For
instance, R&D investment data has to be released by companies if they want
6We are grateful to the partners of Fiduciaire Integrity (Liège) for their precious help
in the data collection stage. They provided us with invaluable explanations about how
R&D expense data is recorded in annual accounts. They also put us in contact with
the government o¢cials in the three regions of Belgium responsible for overseeing R&D
investment tax deductions, enabling us to complete the R&D database. Our data collection
would have been incomplete without their help.
23to be entitled to an increased tax deduction for this type of investment7.
Given the R&D intensity in the biotech sector, a signi…cant part of our
sample (almost 50%) applied to the Belgian regional authorities for this tax
deduction. We were therefore able to supplement our R&D measure with
data from the Regions.
Finally, a last concern is about data in the abbreviated version of annual
accounts. This version only provides total amounts of intangible assets. This
problem can be solved by using information in the “valuation rules” section
of the annual accounts, where …rms should normally indicate the amount of
R&D within intangible assets.
4.2.2 Financing variables
In order to control for …rm size, …nancial structure variables are expressed
in the form of ratios rather than absolute values. We therefore need to
make a choice. A frequently used size variable is the amount of total assets.
However, we do not want to use a variable containing information coming
from the income statement, because this information was already used to
position the observations on the empirical tree. This explains why we prefer
constructing our own size variable, which does not take internal …nancing into
account. Moreover, we are not interested in non-costly short-term debt such
as accounts payable. In summary, the size variable only takes into account
total costly external …nancing. Table 2 de…nes the various capital structure
variables used in the empirical study.
7The Royal Decree of April 17, 1990 details this tax incentive.
24Table 2: De…nition of …nancing variables
Variable NBB accounts item
or data source
De…nition
TOTFIN (10+11+15+17+42+43)t “Total …nancing” = capital +
share premium + investments
grants + total debt
EQUITY (10+11+15)t Total amount of external equity
LEVERAGE (17+42+43)t Total debt
LTDTOT 17t=(8912+8913)t Total long-term debt = debt
payable after 1 year or more
LTD 8913t Long-term debt = debt payable
after 5 years or more
MTD 8912t Mid-term debt = debt payable
between one and 5 years







t Average maturity of long term
debt issued
CONV 8740t Amount of convertible debt out-
standing
LEASE 25t or 172t Lease debt 8
VCPERC Non codi…ed annual
accounts data9
Percentage of capital held by Bel-
gian venture capitalists
4.2.3 Patent variables
The previous part of the paper also sheds some light on the in‡uence of
patenting on capital structure. In order to test their relationships, we need
to construct a variable containing patenting information. Thus for each com-
p a n yi nt h es a m p l ew ec h e c k e df o rt h ee x i s t e n c eo fp a t e n t… l i n g si nt h e
European Patent Database10. We therefore constructed a binary variable,
8The amount of lease debt …nancing is only detailed in the complete versions of Belgian
annual accounts. This is why we have to use the lease asset value as a proxy for lease
…nancing. Nevertheless, this in‡uences only marginally the results, as we checked that
items 25 and 172 are very strongly correlated when available together.
9The data source is the Bel…rst database. The discrimination criteria between venture
capitalists and other shareholders is the belonging of corporate shareholders to the Bel-
gian Venturing Association (www.bvassociation.org) or to the European Venture Capital
association (www.evca.com).
10The Espacenet Database of the European Patent O¢ce (www.european-patent-
o¢ce.org/espacenet) contains information about European patents, as well as covering
25PATENT, that is equal to 1 when the company …led for a patent during the
year under consideration.
4.3 Hypotheses tested and empirical equations
The hypothesis tests are performed by means of OLS regressions of one …-
nancing variable, either in form of a ratio or a ratio variation, on a series of
dummy variables containing either information about the location along the
empirical tree or patenting information.
4.3.1 Relationships between …nancing variables and positioning
variables
The main goal of the empirical study is to test whether the stylized evolutions
of the capital structure presented in the …rst part of the paper are observed
in our sample of Belgian biotechnology …rms. In order to test the various
hypotheses concerning the relationship between …nancing patterns and the
evolution of option value on the asset side, we perform several regressions
of one …nancing variable on a series of dummies representing the di¤erent
branches of the empirical tree. These dummies are de…ned as follows:
² BR¡ = 1 if the company experiences a failure in R&D.
² BR= = 1 if the company experiences a status quo in R&D.
² BR+ = 1 if the company experiences a success in R&D.
² BC¡ = 1 if the company experiences a failure in the commercialization
stage.
² BC= = 1 if the company experiences a status quo in the commercial-
ization stage.
² BC+ = 1 if the company experiences a success in the commercialization
stage.
² BP = 1 if the company remains in the pro…tability stage.
² BU = 1 if the company is in an ”unde…ned” branch, i.e., goes back from
pro…tability to commercialization, or from commercialization to R&D.
the World PCT patent system and a large number of foreign countries.
26Due to data availability problems and the nature of accounting data,
some of the theoretical developments of capital structure cannot be directly
tested. These include all developments related to public debt, not observable
in abbreviate schemes of Belgian annual accounts. Public debt can mostly be
found only in the case of a listed company. As only three …rms are listed in
the Belgian biotechnology sector, it may be expected that public debt is very
scarcely used in our sample. Another problem concerns VC debt …nancing.
As the origin of private debt is not given in accounting data, it is not possible
to test any hypothesis about VC debt …nancing.
The empirically testable hypotheses and the dependent variables used for
e a c ht e s ta r ed e … n e di nT a b l e3 .
Table 3: Financing hypothesis tests and expected outcomes
Hypothesis tested, with
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4.3.2 Relationships between …nancing variables and patents
In order to test the theoretical hypothesis about the in‡uence of patents on
the capital structure, we perform two regressions of …nancing variables on a
dummy re‡ecting the existence or not of a patent …ling, PATENT. The two
hypotheses tests are detailed in the next table.
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5 Empirical results and discussion
This section presents and discusses the empirical results relating to the cap-
ital structure of the Belgian biotechnology …rms sample. We …rst analyze
a number of capital structure ratios in the light of the sample distribution
across stages and branches in the empirical tree. A second part is devoted to
formal empirical tests of the theoretical proposals relating to the evolution
of capital structure with respect to failures/successes along …rms’ develop-
ment path. A third part presents empirical tests about the role of patents in
capital structure.
5.1 Static capital structure analysis
The static analysis involves estimating and testing the mean values of a num-
ber of capital structure ratios11. By contrast, the dynamic analysis relates
to the evolution of these ratios across time.
We compute mean values for static capital structure ratios in three cases.
First, the values for the whole sample can be found in Table 5, as well as
a second set of results for the research and development, commercialization
and pro…tability stages. Table 6 completes the static analysis by detailing
a third set of results when the sample is distributed across branches of the
e m p i r i c a lt r e e( s e eF i g u r e2 ) .
The capital structure ratios taken into consideration can be split into
three groups. A …rst group contains the external equity ratio and its three
components: capital, share premiums and investment grants. The second
group similarly contains the total debt ratio and its three components: long-
term debt, amount of long-term debt payable within one year and short-term
…nancial debt. The …nal group is composed of three variables that will be
11The capital structure ratios are all computed with respect to a common denomina-
tor: the total …nancing variable TOTFIN. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we denote by
“variable name + R” the ratio values of each …nancing variable.
28used in the dynamic analysis: the convertible debt ratio, the lease debt ratio
and the percentage of equity held by venture capitalists (VCs).





EQUITY_R:  0.689 0.717 0.732 * 0.621 ***
1) 10_R 0.595 0.619 0.603 0.562
2) 11_R 0.064 0.056 0.105 *** 0.035 **
3) 15_R 0.031 0.042 * 0.024 0.025
LEVERAGE_R: 0.311 0.283 0.268 * 0.379 ***
1) 17_R 0.192 0.190 0.164 0.219
2) 42_R 0.039 0.031 * 0.035 0.052 **
3) 43_R 0.079 0.062 * 0.070 0.107 **
CONV_R 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.002
LEASE_R 0.028 0.017 ** 0.032 0.036
VCPERC 0.041 0.040 0.055 0.028
b *,**,*** indicates that the stage mean is significantly different from other stage 







a Numbers in italics indicate that the mean is not significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level
364 133 109 122
The analysis of sample mean ratios provides some interesting insights
into sample capital structure patterns. The mean equity ratio for the whole
sample is almost equal to 0.7. This implies that equity …nancing is used about
twice as much as debt …nancing. Moreover, equity capital represents about
60% of the total amount of external and costly …nancing sources, followed
by long-term leverage (19%) and short-term …nancial debt (8%). Among
the di¤erent forms of debt …nancing, convertible debt accounts only for a
minor proportion; the 0.003 ratio sample mean is not signi…cantly di¤erent
from zero at the 5% signi…cance level. This …nding is not surprising when
one looks at the frequency of use of convertible debt: it is only used in
13 observations. Lease debt is not an important source of debt …nancing,
either. Finally, the average VC equity percentage is only equal to 4.1%
across the whole sample. But this observation hides the fact that for a vast
majority of the sample, the VC percentage is equal to 0. When we restrict
the mean to the observations with positive values, we obtain a VC percentage
mean of 28%. In conclusion, sample mean ratio analysis reveals the overall
29characteristics of growth companies, though not necessarily those that typify
biotechnology companies in particular.
This …nding is con…rmed by the analysis of some noticeable di¤erences
between stages. At the pro…tability stage as compared with other stages, the
leverage ratio increases, mainly due to short-term leverage. This obviously
has the e¤ect of reducing the equity ratio. Convertible debt, whenever it is
used, is concentrated at the commercialization stage. Lease …nancing plays
a less important role in the R&D stage than in other stages. This is not
surprising given that it is mainly used to …nance investment in tangible assets.
Finally, the VC ownership percentage is slightly lower at the pro…tability
stage (though not signi…cantly so), suggesting that venture capitalists are
more present at the early stages of development.
Table 6 uses the same capital structure ratios as Table 5, but details
results for the di¤erent branches de…ned in section 4.3.1. Panel A presents
mean values for capital structure ratios across branches, whereas panel B
contains F-values for a number of di¤erence tests between these means.





EQUITY_R: 0.662 0.743 0.731 0.790 0.734 0.539 ** 0.590 *** 0.705
1) 10_R 0.562 0.661 * 0.645 0.620 0.608 0.436 ** 0.543 0.580
2) 11_R 0.054 0.038 0.063 0.160 0.104 0.091 0.023 ** 0.087
3) 15_R 0.046 0.044 0.023 0.010 0.021 0.012 0.024 0.038
LEVERAGE_R: 0.338 0.257 0.269 0.210 0.266 0.461 ** 0.410 *** 0.295
1) 17_R 0.227 0.192 0.183 0.175 0.165 0.210 0.245 ** 0.156
2) 42_R 0.035 0.030 0.037 0.027 0.038 0.072 ** 0.050 0.033
3) 43_R 0.075 0.035 *** 0.049 ** 0.009 0.063 0.179 *** 0.115 ** 0.106 *
CONV_R 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.018 *** 0.000 0.003 0.000
LEASE_R 0.010 0.019 0.016 0.032 0.046 0.065 ** 0.037 0.028
VCPERC 0.038 0.052 0.045 0.040 0.080 ** 0.029 0.017 0.032
Variable
EQUITY_R: 4.369 ** 0.096 1.164 14.404 *** 1.289 4.619 **
1) 10_R 5.709 ** 0.160 0.042 9.661 *** 1.607 2.133
2) 11_R 0.602 1.410 3.729 * 0.209 0.069 1.109
3) 15_R 0.045 3.679 * 0.631 0.391 1.843 0.006
LEVERAGE_R: 4.369 ** 0.096 1.164 14.404 *** 1.289 4.619 **
1) 17_R 1.554 0.081 0.068 1.374 0.951 0.162
2) 42_R 0.370 0.688 1.006 8.717 *** 0.020 3.042 *
3) 43_R 4.744 ** 0.520 5.002 ** 23.294 *** 0.863 9.699 ***
CONV_R 0.601 0.065 11.951 *** 11.951 *** 0.110 0.000
LEASE_R 0.935 0.071 2.322 1.307 0.199 1.383
VCPERC 0.783 0.318 3.693 * 6.128 ** 0.079 0.060
BP
a Numbers in italics indicate that the mean is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level




Panel A: Mean values of capital structure ratios across branches 
a b
BR= BR+ BC+
c *,**,*** indicates that the F-test for differences between means is significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively
26 64 73 7 36 21
b *,**,*** indicates that the branch mean is significantly different from other branch means at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
61
Panel B: Tests of mean differences between branches (F-values) 
c
A vertical analysis of the insigni…cant ratios (in italics in Table 6, Panel
A) shows that these insigni…cant ratios can mostly be found in R&D and
commercialization failure branches. This can be partly explained by the low
number of observations on these branches. Nevertheless, a closer look at these
insigni…cant ratios is still interesting for the second branch. On this branch
investment grants and short-term …nancial debt are almost non-existent. The
only signi…cant …nancing ratios are equity capital (with share premiums) and
31long-term debt. This …nding may suggest that external stakeholders in the
company, such as bankers and public authorities, no longer trust companies
experiencing a failure in commercialization.
Taking a horizontal look at insigni…cant ratios, we notice that invest-
ment grants are not present on any of the commercialization branches and
are the most important on R&D branches. Convertible debt presents only
one signi…cant occurrence, on the commercialization status quo branch. VC
ownership percentage is another variable with a large number of insigni…cant
ratios. Lease debt and VC percentage are both insigni…cant on the two fail-
ure branches. While this …nding may be due to the sample size, it is still
puzzling.
The analysis of signi…cant di¤erences between branches adds further de-
tail to the results presented in Table 5. The equity ratio is the lowest on the
pro…tability and commercialization success branches, which both correspond
to an arrival at the pro…tability stage. At the same time, the share of equity
capital is lowered on those two branches. This is particularly true for com-
panies that experience a success in the commercialization stage: they have
the lowest equity ratio.
Table 6 Panel A also shows that the short-term …nancial debt varies a lot
between branches. Compared with its mean value of 0.079, it is two times
higher for companies experiencing a success in commercialization, while it is
two times lower for the R&D status quo branch. The R&D success branch
is also associated with a higher ratio mean value, while companies along the
pro…tability branch tend to have higher mean values. The reverse applies to
the equity capital ratio on these branches. This may suggest that trusting
relationships with bankers, signalled by high short-term …nancial debt, are
built up mainly at late stages when companies have proved successful in their
development.
Finally, we note that lease …nancing is higher on the commercialization
branches, which can be related as in Table 5 to the nature of leasing itself.
We turn now to the analysis of tests concerning mean di¤erences between
branches. Table 6 Panel B shows the F-values for a number of di¤erence tests.
The tests presented in the …rst four columns try to answer the question of
the nature of status quo branches. As the theoretical analysis suggests, a
status quo in the R&D stage does not necessarily have the same meaning as
a status quo in the commercialization stage. This is why we analyze both
situations separately.
Concerning the R&D status quo branch, in the …rst two columns we test
whether the mean values of capital structure ratios on this branch are signif-
icantly di¤erent or not from each of the two other R&D branches. First, a
high proportion of mean di¤erence tests are signi…cant when comparing sta-
32tus quo with failure, implying that a status quo in R&D cannot be compared
with a failure in R&D. Second, all but one mean di¤erence tests between sta-
tus quo and success are insigni…cant. In other words, mean capital structure
ratios cannot be di¤erentiated in the R&D status quo and success branch.
As expected from the theoretical discussion, from now on we may assimilate
the R&D status quo branch with the R&D success branch.
Mean di¤erence tests in the commercialization branches lead to the oppo-
site conclusion. On the one hand, there are only two signi…cant di¤erences in
means between status quo and failure12, and these do not in any case mainly
relate to the most important ratios, such as equity capital and leverage. On
the other hand, status quo and success branches present a majority of signif-
icant di¤erent ratio means. Therefore, in the following sections we regard a
status quo in commercialization as a failure in commercialization.
The last two sets of tests in Table 6 Panel B are related to mean di¤erences
tests between failure and success branches. At the R&D stage, tests fail to
di¤erentiate capital structure means. Even though this does not imply that
there is no di¤erence, these are not important enough to be signi…cant. This
disappointing …nding may be a sign of a problem in the location of the
companies within the R&D branches. However, this should be viewed in the
context of the huge problems we experienced with the measurement of the
R&D e¤ort. Section 6.2 will come back to this issue. By contrast with the
R&D situation, F-values are higher on the commercialization side. This is
not surprising given the analysis of Panel A for the commercialization failure
and success branches.
5.2 Dynamic capital structure analysis
This section presents the results of several multiple regressions aimed at
testing various hypotheses about the evolution of biotechnology …rms’ capital
structure. Given that the analysis is now dynamic, in the sense that it
looks at variations of capital structure ratios across time, we concentrate our
analysis on the dynamic aspects of the empirical tree, that is, its branches.
As a preliminary step to the formal hypothesis tests, Table 7 details
the regression results of the variation of one capital structure variable13 re-
12We exclude from our analysis the di¤erences tests between convertible debt ratios.
The F-values are meaningless here as there is no occurrence of a positive convertible debt
ratio in both the commercialization failure and success branches.
13See Table 3 for a detailed de…nition of each hypothesis and variable used. Note that
in addition to the regressions presented in this table, we also used a proxy for public debt
…nancing variation, de…ned as the ratio of unsubordinated debentures to total external
…nancing. However, this ratio can be established only for the complete versions of annual
33gressed against a series of dummy variables representing the various existing
branches. The fact that there is no constant term included in the regressions
allows us to interpret each dummy coe¢cient as the mean value of the depen-
dent variable for the branch under consideration. As compared to the static
analysis, the use of variations of variables implies a loss of 40 observations,
corresponding to the …rst observation for each company.
An extensive analysis of each regression is developed in Table 8; this table
presents the same kind of regressions as Table 7, but for groups of branches.
Some of the …ndings in Table 7 are nevertheless worth pointing out .
Table 7: Capital structure hypotheses tests across branches abc
H1: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' LEVERAGE_R t 
0.022 0.000 0.028 0.015 0.120 *** 0.074 ** 0.015 -0.015 °°
(0.032) (0.024) (0.019) (0.062) (0.033) (0.036) (0.023) (0.019)
H2: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' VCPERC t
0.013 0.012 0.006 -0.030 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.002
(0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.038) (0.020) (0.022) (0.014) (0.011)
H3A: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' (STD/LEVERAGE) t 
0.032 0.050 -0.030 -0.203 ° -0.033 0.086 -0.022 0.079 **
(0.065) (0.049) (0.039) (0.126) (0.067) (0.073) (0.048) (0.038)
H3B: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' (MTD/LEVERAGE) t 
-0.076 ° 0.066 0.030 -0.030 0.065 -0.041 0.070 * 0.002
(0.055) (0.041) (0.033) (0.105) (0.056) (0.061) (0.040) (0.032)
H3C: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' (LTD/LEVERAGE) t 
0.006 -0.052 ** 0.029 0.232 *** 0.075 ** 0.002 -0.002 -0.007
(0.035) (0.026) (0.021) (0.067) (0.035) (0.038) (0.025) (0.020)
H3D: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' MATURITY t 
0.014 -0.400 ** 0.055 0.709 0.254 -0.060 -0.120 -0.104
(0.240) (0.180) (0.157) (0.510) (0.247) (0.247) (0.189) (0.146)
H4: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' LEASE_R t 
-0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.030 0.025 ** 0.011 0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
H5: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' CONV_R t 
0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.021 ** 0.000 0.003 -0.010 **
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Independent variables
BR- BR= BR+ BC-
c °,°°,°°° indicates that the coefficient, although not significantly different from 0, is significantly 
different from other coefficients at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level
BC= BU BC+ BP
a Numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the corresponding standard errors
b *,**,*** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
accounts, leaving out a large number of observations. The regressions based on this inde-
pendent variable were not conclusive. This is why we do not mention them in Table 7 or
8.
34The results of regression 1 show several interesting patterns. First, lever-
age increases signi…cantly on the commercialization status quo and success
branches. Second, leverage does not vary signi…cantly on the R&D branches,
implying that debt is not the …nancing vehicle increasingly used at this stage.
This is also true at the pro…tability stage, where leverage no longer varies
signi…cantly. Fourth, the only branch where leverage decreases is the “one-
step-back” branch. Taken together, these observations suggest that debt
…nancing is used as an incremental …nancing source mainly at the commer-
cialization stage.
Concerning the second regression showing the development of the VC
ownership percentage, no coe¢cient proves to be signi…cant. We come back
to this …nding in the discussion of Table 8. Nevertheless, an interesting
pattern occurs: coe¢cient signs are all negative on the commercialization at
pro…tability branches, suggesting that VCs mostly leave at those stages.
Finally, it is interesting to analyze the results of regression 3C, which
presents the evolution of long-term debt. On the commercialization status
quo and success branches, the portion of long-term debt out of total debt
increases greatly. This can be related with some of the results of regression 1,
where total debt increases along those two branches. The increase in leverage
is therefore mainly explained by an increase in long-term debt …nancing.
We turn now to the core of the empirical results, presented in Table 8.
This table has a similar structure to Table 7, except that the branches are
now grouped according to their classi…cation as a success or as a failure. In
addition, the last column of Table 8 presents the estimated F-values of dif-
ference tests between failures and successes, which enables formal hypothesis
tests of a di¤erential evolution of capital structure ratios in case of a failure
as opposed to a success.
35Table 8: Capital structure hypothesis tests with grouping of failure and
success branches abc
H1: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' LEVERAGE_R t 
0.063 *** 0.025 * 0.015 -0.015 3.080 *
(0.022) (0.014) (0.023) (0.019)
H2: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' VCPERC t
0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.002 0.183
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
H3A: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' (STD/LEVERAGE) t 
-0.024 0.014 -0.022 0.079 ** 0.757
(0.044) (0.028) (0.048) (0.038)
H3B: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' (MTD/LEVERAGE) t 
-0.010 0.031 0.070 * 0.002 1.247
(0.037) (0.023) (0.040) (0.032)
H3C: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' (LTD/LEVERAGE) t 
0.063 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 7.610 ***
(0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.021)
H3D: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' MATURITY t 
0.190 -0.127 -0.120 -0.104 3.728 *
(0.164) (0.107) (0.190) (0.146)
H4: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' LEASE_R t 
0.013 * 0.001 0.000 -0.001 2.902 *
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
H5: dependent variable = ' ' ' ' CONV_R t 
0.010 * 0.001 0.003 -0.010 ** 2.524
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
BU
a Numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the 
corresponding standard errors
b *,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 0, or 
that the F-test is significant, at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively










Hypothesis 1 states that the leverage ratio should be lowered in case of
a failure as opposed to a success. The …rst regression in Table 8 shows that
in the cases both of a success and a failure, leverage increases signi…cantly.
But although they have the same sign, the failure coe¢cient is signi…cantly
higher than the success coe¢cient. In other words, leverage increases more
in case of a failure than in the case of a success, which is contrary to the
theoretically expected outcome on the basis of the trade-o¤ theory. This
important …nding suggests that over the period under consideration, Belgian
biotechnology …rms tend to …nance a failure with increased recourse to debt
…nancing, whereas the natural …nancing candidate when a failure occurs is
36rather equity capital. The only matching explanation would be a shift of VC
…nancing from equity to debt, but this particular point does not prove to be
testable. It means however that although companies w o u l dn e e dm o r ee q u i t y
– as suggested by trade-o¤ theory, the main available resource of funds from
investors is debt. This …nding raises the question of the undercapitalization
of young growing biotech companies. We will come back to this issue later
in Section 6.1.
The second regression examines the evolution of the VC ownership per-
centage. As there is no signi…cant coe¢cient for this regression, we cannot
draw any conclusion about the hypothesis that the VC ownership percentage
should decrease in case of a failure as opposed to a success. This inconclu-
sive result is mainly explained by the stability of VC ownership over time –
or its absence. Indeed, the vast majority of observations for this dependent
variable are equal to 0.
The third testable hypothesis states that a failure should be associated
with higher maturity than a success. We test this hypothesis in two ways.
First, in regressions 3A to 3C we look at the evolution of three segments of
debt according to their maturity, with respect to the amount of total debt.
On the one hand, short-term and mid-term debt are reduced in case of a
failure, while they increase when a success takes place. Although consistent
with the predictions, the di¤erence between both coe¢cients is not signi…-
cant. On the other hand, the long-term debt failure coe¢cient is signi…cantly
positive and di¤erent from the slightly negative success coe¢cient. This sug-
gests that maturity increases when a failure takes place, corresponding to
the interpretation of greater ‡exibility from debt instruments. Second, in
order to synthesize the evolution of debt maturity in a single regression, in
regression 3D we use the evolution of a proxy for maturity as a dependent
variable. The results con…rm what is found in hypotheses 3A to 3C: maturity
increases for failure branches and decreases for success branches. Although
the coe¢cients are not signi…cantly positive or negative, they are neverthe-
less signi…cantly di¤erent from each other. This …nding is in line with the
evolution expected on a theoretical basis.
The fourth hypothesis is related to the test for whether lease debt in-
creases when a failure takes place. The coe¢cient on failure branches is
indeed positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from the success coe¢cient, which
con…rms the theoretical predictions. It is interesting to notice the virtual
absence of any lease …nancing for …rms in a more successful stage, imply-
ing that leasing can really be interpreted as ‘last recourse …nancing’ in the
context of biotechnology companies.
Finally, the last testable hypothesis states that convertible debt …nancing
should increase in case of a failure as opposed to a success. Despite the very
37small number of observations where convertible debt is positive, it increases
mainly when …rms experience a failure. However, the di¤erence test between
failures and successes is not signi…cant. This …nding suggests that although
convertible debt is very rarely used by Belgian biotechnology companies, it
is used at the right time from a theoretical viewpoint by the few companies
that do actually use it.
5.3 The in‡uence of patenting
The last hypothesis presented in the theoretical part of the paper relates
to the in‡uence of patents on capital structure ratios. Table 9 presents
the results of two formal tests of this in‡uence. The …rst regression tests
whether the companies that have …led for at least one patent issue more
long-term debt. The second test looks at the in‡uence of patents on the use
of convertible debt …nancing.
Unlike previous hypothesis tests, both regressions presented in Table 9
incorporate a constant term. The role of this term is to capture the mean
value of the capital structure ratios in the case of no patent …ling. The
coe¢cient on the patent dummy can therefore be interpreted as the mean
variation of the ratio for companies having …led for at least one patent.
Table 9: Capital structure hypothesis tests with respect to patent …ling
information ab
H6A: dependent variable = LTDTOT_R t 
0.159 *** 0.088 ***
(0.015) (0.024)
H6B: dependent variable = CONV_R t 
0.000 0.008 **
(0.002) (0.003)
b *,**,*** indicates that the coefficient is significantly 
different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Constant PATENT
Independent variable
a Numbers in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients are the corresponding standard errors
Hypotheses 6A and 6B state that the existence of a patent …ling should
have a positive impact both on leverage and on convertible debt. As the
coe¢cients on the patent dummy are both signi…cantly greater than zero,
we can conclude that patents play the role expected from the theoretical
discussion, in that they call for more ‡exible and longer-term …nancing.
38The magnitude of these e¤ects is very strong and informative. On average,
patenting companies use 50% more long-term …nancing than non-patenting
corporations. When one looks at convertible …nancing, the relative size of
this …nancing instrument for patenting companies is two times higher than
the mean ratio for the whole sample. This indicates a consistent recognition,
both from investors and from corporations, of the option to wait embedded
in the patent …ling and the associated relevant …nancing vehicles.
6 Policy recommendations
The aim of this section is to bring out recommendations for policy makers,
mainly related to two topics. The …rst topic concerns the data problems we
experienced in the empirical study. If available data had been more accurate,
then tests on capital structure would have been more robust and our …ndings
more balanced, allowing us to draw stronger and more contrasted conclusions.
The …rst part of this section deals with this data issue and leads to a wish
of better matching between …nancial reality and accounting data, which may
partly be short of …nancial reality.
The second topic concerns the pro…le of Belgian bio-industry capital struc-
ture we pointed out in Section 5. The observed patterns are not always in
line with …nancing theory. To some extent, this can be interpreted as a mis-
match between entrepreneurs and capital providers’ viewpoint. The second
part therefore tries to shed some light on the priorities for policy makers in
terms of …nancing policy.
6.1 Accounting data versus …nancial reality : better
matching between accounting rules and relevant
information
In the empirical part of this study, we analyze company accounts from their
inception until their last available …nancial statements. Given the fact that
the biotechnology sector is a young, growing sector in Belgium, this means
that we have to rely partly on abbreviated versions of annual accounts for the
data used. Per se, abbreviated accounts do not contain as much detail as full
accounts, leading to a bias in the data collection process and in the choice of
testable hypotheses. For example, we were not able to test any hypothesis
involving public debt because this item only appears in the full accounts.
However, there are also other data problems of a more crucial nature that
are not dependent on the version of the annual accounts that is used. Rather,
39they are due to the inadequate information provided by annual accounts in
general, especially in relation to research and development data.
In addition to the research and development data found in the note on
intangible assets in the notes on the annual accounts, we set up an original
sector-based R&D database using a number of indirect sources of information,
of both an accounting and non-accounting nature: the management report,
the valuation rules in the notes on the annual accounts, and R&D investment
tax deduction information.
One important piece of information about R&D activities that cannot be
measured directly from the annual accounts is the amount of R&D that has
not been capitalized in the balance sheet. This amount is included in with
the operating expenses in the pro…t and loss account. Although Belgian ac-
counting law stipulates that indirect information about these expenses must
be provided in the management report, our research reveals that the law
is not precise enough on the content of the R&D information to be men-
tioned in the management report. As a result, this report therefore often
con…nes itself to reproducing quantitative information that is already avail-
able in the annual accounts. Although companies usually provide qualitative
information, this information is still insu¢cient to give a detailed view of
the company’s R&D policy. This problem is exacerbated in the abbreviated
annual accounts, where there is no obligation to disclose the management
report. Hence, information about the R&D policy is almost never available
in abbreviated annual accounts.
Information about R&D expenses can also be found in non-accounting
sources. For example, we had access to information relating to R&D invest-
ment tax subsidies from the regional authorities. Other sources of informa-
tion in Belgium (publicly available or not) include OSTC R&D investment
surveys14 and regional databases about investment and operating subsidies
to promote R&D. R&D data is thus widely dispersed. From their external
viewpoint, researchers and …nancial analysts cannot obtain a complete view
of the R&D e¤ort of any Belgian company, especially in biotechnology, where
R&D is a central issue. A more accurate assessment of R&D activities would
be desirable, and this could be achieved, for instance, by linking existing
databases together.
Coming back to accounting information, although …nancial structure in-
formation is much better presented in annual accounts than R&D infor-
mation, there are some noteworthy exceptions. First, while information
14Cincera (2002) uses R&D information from this source. However, this information
source was not particularly suitable for use in our study because it is based on surveys
and therefore does not systematically include biotechnology companies.
40about equity ownership structure is available in accounting databases such
as Bel…rst, debt “ownership” structure is less easy to obtain, and almost im-
possible for some important categories of debtholders in the biotechnology
sector, such as venture capitalists. To some extent, the full annual accounts
compensate for the lack of debt “ownership” structure information by de-
tailing certain classes of debt such as public debt, banking debt and lease
debt. The issue is all the more crucial in abbreviated annual accounts, where
long-term debt is not split between these classes. This explains why some of
the hypotheses could not be tested.
In conclusion, with regard to accounting information, we do not call for
an increase in the quantity of data released in the annual accounts so much
as for changes to be made which would make this information more relevant
to the external reader.
6.2 Financing reality versus theory: better matching
between entrepreneurs and capital providers
The empirical results presented in Section 5 show a number of interesting
patterns in the capital structure of Belgian biotechnology …rms. These ob-
served patterns allow us to draw a number of conclusions about the …nancing
reality in this high-tech sector. These …ndings may question managers as well
as capital suppliers.
The main issue raised in the discussion of empirical results relates to the
…nding that the “best” …nancing source for companies in case of a failure
should be equity capital, while we observe that leverage is the main available
instrument in this situation, during the period under consideration. In other
words, the market for equity capital, either from private or public source,
does not always play its role of capital provider for young and risky ventures.
Belgium seems therefore to lack a suitable and well-developed equity capital
culture. Moreover, while most biotechnology …rms in the Anglo-Saxon world
have a leverage ratio tending to zero, especially in their early stages of de-
velopment – corresponding to the predictions of the trade-o¤ theory, Belgian
biotechnology companies exhibit a much more levered capital structure ratio,
and increase their proportion of leverage when their situation worsens.
It is possible that the heavy recourse to debt …nancing corresponds to the
unusually large and easy availability of cheap, long term sources of capital
from …nancial intermediaries. This explanation is not necessarily related to a
shortage of equity funds supply, but to a neglection of this source of capital
by companies. The lengthening of average debt maturity partially supports
this hypothesis.
41A less appealing interpretation would be that total funds available from
VCs are insu¢cient to provide required capital for companies in the sector.
This is a natural way of explaining the shortage of equity capital in the
biotechnology industry and the recourse to bank debt …nancing. Such a
hypothesis reveals to be frightening as future development of the sector has
to be foreseen. Huge demands for additional capital are to be expected from
this blossoming sector in the near future; in Canada, where VC …nancing is
currently su¢cient to …nance a tremendous amount of biotech companies,
the study of future capital needs made by Bergeron et Al. (2002) indicates
that a shortage of funds is to be expected under any realistic forward-looking
scenario. Such a …nding may prove to be all the more relevant in the case of
Belgium, where initial conditions are not even satisfactory.
Anyway, the relative undercapitalization of a young and promising sector
like bio-industry is all the more a crucial issue that the banking world seems
more and more less willing to play the role of risky fund providers at the
early stages of a company’s life. We therefore speak for measures aiming a
developing a stronger culture of shareholding and venture …nancing.
I nt h es a m ev e i n ,t h es a m p l eo fb i o t e c h n o l o g y… r m sw es t u d i e di nt h e
empirical part very rarely uses ‡exible hybrid …nancing like convertible debt.
The theoretical part of the study emphasizes on the virtues of convertible
debt especially in the case of high growth companies like biotechnology …rms.
The use of convertible debt may be a good solution to the undercapitalization
problem pointed out above, in that it allows potential pessimistic sharehold-
ers to meet their desire of claims on the company when it experiences a
failure, without imposing on the company the full burden of high debt costs.
On one side, the …nding of the accurate use of convertibles conveys good
news; on the other side, the scarcity of this instrument in Belgian bio-
industries is still somewhat surprising. After all, the convertible security
is a form of delayed equity …nancing conditional of the …rm performing well.
Our previous …nding of shortage of equity when the moneyness of real op-
tions decreases would actually support a more accurate and elegant …nancing
s o l u t i o nt h r o u g hm u c hm o r ei n t e n s i v eu s eo fc o n v e r t i b l es e c u r i t i e s .
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
By means of an empirical analysis of capital structure ratio with respect to
the development path of Belgian biotechnology …rms, the aim of this paper
is to test whether biotechnology …rms’ …nancing decisions are consistent,
in terms of their cost-‡exibility trade-o¤, with their investment pattern, in
terms of the evolution of its real option component.
42In order to achieve this, we …rst set up an exploratory model to character-
ize the evolution of biotechnology …rms along a multinomial tree capturing
the development path of each company. This model is not a valuation model
but rather an attempt to assess the evolution of companies along this tree
and classify their evolution in terms of success, status quo or failure for a
given development stage. From this classi…cation we then derive a number
of proposals about the adequate …nancing instruments companies should use
with respect to their development path.
In the empirical part of the study, we manage to test and con…rm most
of our hypotheses about theoretically expected evolutions of capital struc-
ture ratios. The results can be summarized as follows. Our study reveals
that Belgian biotechnology …rms seem to have a good approach to the …-
nancing consequences of patenting, in that they increase the option value to
wait and therefore enable for more ‡exible and long-term …nancing. More-
over, tests performed on companies that experience a success, in the sense
that they follow a successful development path, show that these companies
seem to make harmonious …nancing decisions. The behavior of companies
experiencing failures along their development path is less clear. In this case,
Belgian biotechnology companies seem to adapt their capital structure in a
way not necessarily consistent with theoretical expectations. By using more
straight debt, companies may forego the advantages of more hybrid and elab-
orated …nancing instruments like convertible debt. Financial innovation, even
though it is not absent in the Belgian bio-industry, is nevertheless underused.
High-tech companies like biotechnology companies, driven by innovation and
technology, could therefore gain some …nancial strength by having a more
modern and innovative approach to their …nancing decisions.
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